TL;DR: To change an email password, go to your provider’s account security settings, choose change password, enter the current one, then set a new one. The correct entry point is the provider’s own settings page reached by typing the domain into the address bar — never a link in an email, because password-change phishing is built precisely on that reflex. After changing it, update your password manager and check for sessions that should be signed out.
The general sequence
Every major provider follows the same four steps, even though the menu names differ.
One. Sign in at the provider’s own site, typed directly into the address bar.
Two. Find the security section of account settings — usually called Security, Sign-in & security, or Account security.
Three. Choose the password option. Most providers require the current password before accepting a new one, which is a guard against someone with an unlocked device.
Four. Set the new password and confirm. Many providers then offer to sign out other devices.
The last step is the one people skip, and it is the one that matters after a suspected compromise: changing a password does not invalidate sessions already established on other devices unless you explicitly revoke them.
Where the settings live, by provider
The navigation differs enough to be worth spelling out.
Gmail. Google Account → Security → How you sign in → Password. Google usually requires re-authentication, and it may ask for a second factor.
Outlook and Microsoft accounts. account.microsoft.com → Security → Change password. Microsoft accounts include both outlook.com and any address hosted by Microsoft 365.
Apple iCloud. System settings → Apple Account → Sign-In & Security → Change Password, or appleid.apple.com from a browser.
Yahoo. Account Info → Sign-in and security → Password.
Proton and other privacy providers. Settings → Account and password. Expect a longer verification flow.
Work and university accounts. These are usually managed by an administrator, and the change may need to be done through an internal portal or by contacting IT. If the account is part of an organisation, self-service may be disabled by policy.
The phishing pattern to recognise
Password-change emails are the most effective phishing template because they create urgency and a plausible reason to click.
The signs are consistent. The link’s real destination, visible on hover, does not match the provider’s domain. The email asks you to confirm your current password — legitimate providers never ask you to type a password into a page reached from an email. The greeting is generic. And the message threatens imminent loss of access if you do not act within a short window.
The countermeasure is procedural, not vigilance-based: never change a password from a link. Open a new tab, type the provider’s address, and navigate. That single habit defeats the entire category, because the attacker cannot control a page you reached by typing the domain yourself.
If you cannot remember the current password
The current-password requirement is not a dead end; it is a check, and providers offer a bypass through account recovery.
The standard path is “forgot password” on the sign-in page, which sends a reset link or code to a recovery channel — an alternate email or a phone number. That is precisely why every account should have a recovery method that is itself secure and current.
The common failure is a recovery address that is no longer accessible — an old work email, a phone number that has been reassigned. If your recovery route is stale, fix it before you need it, because recovery is exactly when you cannot afford a secondary problem.
What makes the new password actually better
Changing a password to another weak one accomplishes nothing. Three points matter more than length rules.
Uniqueness beats complexity. A long passphrase used on exactly one site is better than a short jumble of symbols reused across ten. Credential-stuffing attacks rely on reuse, so reuse is the property that gets you breached.
Length is the main lever. Four unrelated words beat eight characters of symbols, because the search space is larger and the phrase is easier to remember without writing it down.
The manager is the point. If you are memorising passwords, you will reuse them. A password manager removes the trade-off, and the only password you need to remember is the vault’s.
If you want a genuinely random string for a high-value account, a random password generator produces one with adequate entropy, which is the property that actually resists guessing — unlike human-chosen patterns that look random and are not.
After the change: four follow-ups
Update the password manager. An old entry that no longer works is worse than no entry, because it makes you think you have the credential when you do not.
Revoke other sessions. Sign out of all devices, then sign back in on the ones you use. This is what actually evicts anyone who had access.
Check recovery settings. Confirm the recovery email and phone number are current and controlled by you.
Enable two-factor authentication. A password change addresses the past; two-factor addresses the future, because it makes a stolen password insufficient on its own.
The short version
Type the provider’s domain, go to account security, change the password with the current one as verification, then update your manager and revoke other sessions. Never use a link from an email. Use a unique passphrase or generated random string, and enable two-factor once the password is settled.